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MEDIATION’S EFFECTS: TEST, DON’T GUESS
By:
James A. Wall & Kyle R. Holley
As it glides down a broad valley, a river occasionally cuts a second channel, so that its
water flows in parallel conduits. The second channel behaves in a manner quite different from
the main artery (usually it runs faster) and it can modify the nature of the main river (decreasing
its volume). Analogously, the civil court system has opened a second channel – mediation – in
which the process/flow is quite different from that in the main civil-case channel. As such, the
mediation channel is perhaps modifying the primary system.
The literature convincingly indicates that the court system now has two channels – the
trial route as well as mediation – and we will describe the mediation channel quite thoroughly.
Specifically, we will delineate how the mediators, attorneys, and clients behave. Additionally,
we will note the effects of the mediators’ strategies, the mediation outcomes, and how the
mediators think. When describing the mediation channel, we will also point out how it differs
from the main legal channel. For example, it is less formal, and at times there can be no
agreement.
Our description of the mediation channel will make up the bulk of the chapter, while the
delineation of how mediation affects the main court system will be briefer as it is more
challenging to construct. Consider now the mediation system. We first delineate its process and
then will present the theoretical overview.

Mediation Process
In the mediations we observed, the mediator, plaintiff, defendant, and their attorneys met
at an agreed-upon time and location. Typically, the mediator arrives first and when the other
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parties arrive, the plaintiffs and their attorney are escorted to one room and the defendants and
their attorney to another.
Initially, the mediator goes to each room for introductions and then brings all parties
together in a central room. This is the “joint” session. Here, the mediator thanks the disputants
for their attendance, describes his background, discusses the value of mediation, and indicates
how the mediation will be conducted. Next, the plaintiff attorney presents its case, the defense
attorney does the same; questions are asked and answered.
Ending the opening joint session, the mediator tells the plaintiffs and defendants to go to
their respective rooms, and the mediation begins. The mediator usually meets privately with the
plaintiffs, first. After a discussion and obtaining an opening demand, the mediator then ambles
over to the defendant’s room. Here, he discusses the case, presents the plaintiff’s offer, and
requests a counter offer. Thereafter, the mediator commutes between the plaintiff and
defendant’s rooms until there is a settlement or firm deadlock.
Theoretical Framework
Having described the operational procedure of the mediation, we now turn to the
theoretical framework (Figure 1). Here, we draw upon systems and control theory to note that
mediation is a decision making process that operates in an environment.
This institutional environment is the U.S. civil court system which can allow or require
cases to be sent to mediation. The cases themselves are civil ones (e.g., automobile injuries,
contract disputes, medical malpractice claims, personal injuries) rather than criminal.
In addition to directing cases to mediation, the overall court system sets norms for all
parties. The mediation is voluntary; therefore, the mediator can choose whether to accept the
case. While in the mediation, disputants can, at any time, withdraw from the mediation. The
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mediator is required to be neutral, cannot give legal advice, and cannot dictate an agreement. But
the mediator does control the process. On the other side, the disputants are required to bargain in
good faith, respect the law and mediator, and allow the mediator to control the process.
Within the mediation are at least three decision makers: one mediator, and two or more
disputants (e.g., plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys). As depicted by control theory, the mediator
has goals (e.g., agreement and disputant concessions) and compares them to the current state.
If there is a discrepancy (e.g., no agreement), the mediator employs various techniques to
improve the current state.

The plaintiffs and defendants engage in parallel patterns of behavior. They also have
goals (e.g., a large payment from the opponent) and compare them to the current state (e.g., a
modest offer). When finding a discrepancy, the plaintiffs and defendants adopt tactics to modify
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the current state. Typically, these behaviors entail comments to the mediator and messages or
offers to the opponent.
The interactive mediation process between the mediator, plaintiff, and defendant has
potential consequences for parties not physically at the mediation but are affected by the
deliberations (e.g., children in divorce mediations). As indicated in Figure 1, these outcomes feed
back to affect the behavior of the interacting parties. For example, if a mediator’s pressing causes
the disputants to leave the mediation and go to trial, then the mediator is apt to reduce the
pressing.
Research Strategy
When studying civil case mediations, we utilize a process called triangulation, (Figure 2)
which entails three components: literature reviews, interviews, and observations of mediations.
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Reading and understanding the literature allows us to determine what is currently known about
civil case mediation, such as what questions are important and which ones remain unanswered.
The literature also indicates which testable hypotheses can be developed about behaviors and
outcomes in the mediations.
Interviews with attorneys, judges, and mediators allow us to describe mediations, to
tentatively conclude what is known about the mediation process, and to develop testable
hypotheses. Also, a comparison of the interview responses with the literature enables us to
identify gaps and misperceptions in our knowledge.
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Turning to our observations of actual mediations, this approach allows us to test
hypotheses, answer questions about mediations, correct some misperceptions, and identify areas
in which there is agreement among the literature, the interviews, and our observations.
A few words about our observation approach: it was meticulous and rather unique. An
observer accompanied the mediator through every phase of the mediation, starting with a
discussion before the mediation and concluding with a post-mediation interview. In the pre- and
post-mediation sessions, the observer recorded the mediators’ comments. In the joint and
separate sessions, the observer recorded exactly what they parties said – in sequence – as well as
the demands, concessions, and agreements.
As the mediators moved from room to room, they were asked questions about their
behavior as well as their thinking. Their responses were recorded accordingly.
The disputants’ and mediators’ comments were subsequently coded by two raters using
the categories in Tables 1 and 2. When differences occurred, the raters conferred at mutually
acceptable classifications.

122  

Table 1
Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Techniques (Sample Listing)

Technique

Description

Notes strength of own case

Disputant strengthens own case or argues that it is
strong.

Indicates weakness of opponent’s case

Weaknesses in the other’s case are cited or the
other is claimed to be weak in some way.

Notes relative advantage in trial

Disputant indicates that it has an advantage or
strength in the trial or with the judge, jury, location,
etc.

Gives information

The disputant gives information to the mediator for
the mediator or the other party. Includes stating
one’s own preferences.

Asks for information

Disputant asks for information from the other
disputant or the mediator.

Weakens self

Disputant cites or admits a weakness of its own.

Criticizes other

The disputant criticizes the other’s action,
concession, attitude, posture, etc.

Empathy/understanding for mediator

Disputant expresses empathy or understanding for
the mediator.

Praise mediator

Praise, compliments or nice statements about the
mediator.
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Table 2
Mediators’ Techniques (Sample Listing)

Techniques

Description

Points out weakness of disputant’s
case

The mediator weakens the disputants’ case, or mentions a
weakness of the disputants’ case.

Indicates strength of opponent’s case

Mediator supports, strengthens or argues the case of the
other disputant. Includes mentioning the other has a strong
case.

Notes costs and risks of trial for the
disputant

Mention of the risk or cost of trial to the disputant. Can
entail mention of uncertainty and speculations of what the
judge, arbitrator, or judge might do. Includes other’s
advantage in trial.

Asks for information

Mediator collects or asks for information from the
disputants, documents, or third parties. Includes having the
disputants state their points of view.

Weakens other

Mediator mentions a weakness of the other disputant or
weakens the other in some way.

Criticizes disputant

Mediator criticizes a disputants’ action, attitude, or person.

Criticizes other

Mediator criticizes or mentions a negative aspect of the
other.

Strengthens disputant

The mediator supports, strengthens, or argues the case for the
disputant.

Shows empathy or understanding for
disputant

Mediator shows empathy or understanding for the disputant.
Includes saying the other has this.

Our analyses of the mediators’, plaintiffs’, and defendants’ statements, offers,
concessions, agreements, and deadlocks allowed us to accurately describe the mediation process
and determine the causal patterns within.
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We can draw the following conclusions about civil case mediations based on the
aforementioned observations, analyses, literature reviews, and interviews with mediators, judges,
and attorneys.
Research Results
Goals. With regard to the mediators’ goals (Figure 1), our research indicates they are of
two types: primary and operational. Primary goals are settlement of the case, as well as clients’
and attorneys’ satisfaction. Also, many mediators wish to attain repeat business. Turning to the
operational goals – those that the mediators believe underpin the attainment of the primary goals
– we found three: client control, reduced client and attorney aspirations, and the heightening of
clients’ anxiety about trial.
Of signal importance are the goals we found to be absent. No mediators mentioned
transformation goals, that is, the goals of improving the relationship between the parties or
improving the attorneys’ or clients’ negotiation skills.
Finding no mention of these goals, we asked the mediators specifically if they pursued
these objectives. Their responses across the board was, “No.” When asked why, they replied that
the plaintiffs and defendants would likely not meet again so there was no reason to improve their
relationships. While the attorneys might interact in the future, the mediators felt they were
capable of maintaining an amicable working relationship. Therefore, there was no need to
improve the relationship.
As for improved negotiation skills, the mediators consistently held that attorneys had
sufficient negotiation skills. Thus the mediators did not believe it was their responsibility to
improve the skills of negotiation-challenged attorneys.
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Mediators’ behaviors. With these primary and operational goals in their sights, mediators
engage (Figure 1) in behaviors to accomplish them. The literature indicates that mediators have
approximately one hundred techniques to choose from and researchers have conceptually – but
not empirically – categorized them into about two-dozen strategic groups.1
As the above statements imply, the literature describing the mediators’ behaviors is
voluminous. Yet, our research indicates that much of the mediators’ behavior can be condensed
to a vector of assertiveness. Some mediators are very assertive, attempting to press parties off
positions, trying to reduce aspirations, emphasizing the risks of trial, or noting the strength of the
opponent and the high cost of a trial. Other mediators are less assertive, allowing the parties to
make their own calculations and chart their own courses.
Mediation outcomes. What are the effects of the mediators’ behaviors? The literature on
various types of mediation indicates that mediation leads to a high level of agreement as well as
to a high level of participant satisfaction.2 This literature is consistent with our observational
studies; however, the literature in general does not indicate which techniques are most effective.
Rather, it reports that mediation results in a high agreement rate and disputant satisfaction.
Which specific techniques are most effective? The quest for an answer reveals the value
of triangulation. Our conversations with plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and judges revealed
that most believed assertive mediator behavior engendered more agreements. Yet the mediators
often cautioned that such assertiveness probably would lower parties’ satisfaction.
Our research mirrors these thoughts. In an observational study of 100 mediations, we
1

James A. Wall Jr. & Timothy C. Dunne, Mediation Research: A Current Review, 28 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 236
(2012).
2

James A. Wall Jr., Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research, 25 J. C ONFLICT R ESOL . 157 (1981);
James A. Wall Jr. & Ann Lynn, Mediation: A Current Review, 37 J. C ONFLICT R ESOL . 160 (1993); James A. Wall
Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. C ONFLICT
R ESOL . 370 (2001); Wall & Dunne, supra note 1.
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found that assertive mediators – those using an evaluative or pressing strategy – attained a higher
rate of settlement (69% and 59%, respectively) than did those who employed a neutral strategy
(28%).
The evaluative and pressing strategies did result in lower party satisfaction (6.0 and 5.7,
respectively on a 7-point scale) than did a neutral (6.2) strategy.3 Yet, as a comparison among
the above numbers reveals, the difference in satisfaction was not as great as that for agreements.
The literature, we find corroborates strongly with our interviews and our observational
studies. As Figure 3 reveals, the literature from studies of mediations in very diverse fields
indicate that mediator assertiveness is strongly associated with disputant agreement.
Only one study found that assertiveness hinders agreement. Note also that only two studies
indicate that assertiveness reduces disputants’ satisfaction.4

3

James A. Wall Jr., Timothy C. Dunne & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, The Effects of Neutral, Evaluative, and Pressing
Mediator Strategies, 29 C ONFLICT R ESOL . Q. 127 (2011).

4

Id.; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical
Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 684-85 (2002).
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Mediation Outcomes versus Trial Outcomes
The preceding discussion of the mediation outcomes – and the mediator behaviors that
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spawned them – brings us to a pivotal question. How do the mediation outcomes compare to the
outcomes in the regular legal system? Specifically,
1.   Are mediations quicker?
2.   Are mediations less costly?
3.   Are there more settlements in mediation than in the central legal system (i.e., trial)?
4.   Are clients more pleased with mediation than with trials?
The first two questions can be answered affirmatively. While no empirical studies have
focused specifically on these queries, reports from attorneys, judges, and clients, as well as
opinions voiced in the literature, report mediation is more expedient and less costly than trials.
Such reports correlate quite well with simple reasoning.
Consider first, speed. Based on our observations and discussions with mediators, the
average civil case mediation requires less than eight hours. Probably, the same case, with jury
selection, opening statements, evidence presentation, statements by parties, cross-examinations,
jury deliberations, etc. will take at least three days in trial.
Turning to cost, (question 2) we again can make some rudimentary comparative
calculations. The mediation costs below were based on discussions with mediators we have
observed and interacted with over the years. For an average case, the mediation costs would be
approximately:
Administrative fee
8 hours, mediator costs
8 hours, defense attorney costs
8 hours, plaintiff attorney costs
Value of plaintiff’s time
Value of defendant’s time

$400
$3,200
$2,000
$2,000
$800
$800

Total

$11,200

(These costs do not include depositions, preparation costs, etc., which would occur in the
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mediation or the trial.)
For the trial, the costs would be at least:
Court fees
3 days defense attorney costs
3 days plaintiff attorney costs
Value of plaintiff’s time
Value of defendant’s time

$300
$6,000
$6,000
$2,400
$2,400

Total

$17,200

Admittedly, these are rough estimates, but they make the point that trials – because they require
more time – are more expensive than mediation. If some readers disagree, we encourage them to
pose a case in which the mediation costs more than a trial.
Moving to the next two questions – are there more settlements in mediation, and are
clients more pleased with mediation? – the answer to both is that we do not know.
To ferret out the answers we need to conduct some studies; that is, we should test, not
guess. Consider question 3, Are there more settlements in mediation – that is, a higher
percentage of settlements – than in the cases that remain in the regular court system. Since
mediations have a settlement rate of roughly 70%, one’s initial answer is affirmative. Yet, we
know that only about 2% of the filed cases in the legal system go to trial. So now we are not so
sure. We need to gather some data to answer this question.
Study 1, depicted in Figure 4, is a simple one designed to answer this question.
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Study 1
Year

Not Mediated
Cases
Filed

Mediated

Cases
Scheduled
For Trial

Cases
Settled
Before
Trial

Cases Settled/
Cases Scheduled
For Trial

Cases
Filed

Cases
Scheduled
For Trial

Cases
Settled
Before
Trial

Cases Settled/
Cases Scheduled
For Trial

2010

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2011

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2012

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2013

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2014

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2015

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2016

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2017

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2018

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2019

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

2020

x

x

x

%

x

x

x

%

Figure 4
Study 1

It entails tracking filed cases that do not go to mediation versus those which do. Researchers
would look at the number of cases filed in each year, the number scheduled for trial, and those
settled before trial. The percentage of the trial-scheduled cases which settled in the non-mediated
channel (Column 5) versus the percentage of trial-scheduled cases which settled in the mediation
channel (Column 9) would answer the question: Are there a higher percentage of settlements in
mediated versus non-mediated cases?
For the question, “Are clients more pleased in mediated cases than in those which do not
go to mediation?” the study (as shown in Figure 5) is less arduous to conduct.
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Study	
  2	
  
	
  

	
  
Mediated

Settled
Without
Mediation

Tried

Settled

Not
Settled

Dependent	
  Variable	
  
- Clients’ satisfaction

Figure 5
Study 2

In Study 2, researchers could interview clients (and perhaps attorneys) after the cases were
mediated, after non-mediated cases were settled, or after non-mediated cases went through in
trial. During the interview (or surveys) they could measure the parties’ satisfaction with the
procedure. Subsequently, the responses in the three conditions could be compared to determine if
clients are more pleased with mediation over trials, or if they are more pleased with mediation
than in cases that settled without mediation. This study would also allow researchers to
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determine if clients are more satisfied in mediations that settled than in those where there is not
settlement.
The Effect of Mediation on the Legal System
To this point, we have said the civil court system has opened a second channel to handle
mediation cases. In the mediations, the mediator interacts with the parties and when doing so has
goals that are pursued. The mediators’ behaviors are generally effective, resulting in a high level
of agreement and satisfaction, as well as in lower costs and speedier handling of the cases. The
most effective mediator behaviors appear to be assertive ones, in that they significantly increase
agreements, with a somewhat minor decrease in satisfaction. It appears rather evident that
mediations are quicker than trials and less costly. With regard to the number of settlements, we
know the settlement rate in mediations is high but we do not know if it is higher than for nonmediated cases. We need a study to answer this question.
Also, we know that clients and attorneys are quite satisfied with mediation; however, we
do not know if their satisfaction in mediated cases is higher than for cases that are not mediated.
Another study is called for to answer this question.
Having established that mediation is working rather well, we can turn to its effect on the
regular legal system.
When we asked mediators, judges, and attorneys about this effect, the predominant
answer was mediation reduces the number of cases that must be tried in the regular system. In
the literature we also find such opinions but very little hard evidence and a high level of
variance.5 Some attorneys say a large percentage of their cases go to mediation, while others

5

Janine Robben, Oregon’s Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: A Treasured Right, or a Relic?, OR. ST. B. BULL. (Nov.
2009) available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09nov/jurytrial.html; Teresa G. Campbell & Sharon L.
Pizzuti, The Effectiveness of Case Evaluation and Mediation in Michigan Circuit Courts, REP. TO THE ST. CT.
ADMIN. OFF., MICH. SUP. CT. (Oct. 31, 2011),
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hold that very few do so.
When we examine the hard data, we conclude that mediation is probably not having a
significant impact, nation-wide, on the number of cases going to trial. Consider that in 2012,
there were 303,820 civil filings in U.S. district courts6 and 15,883,105 in state courts.7 The total
is about 16 million. As for the number of mediations in the U.S., there is no overall report and
the best guess we can locate is 250,000.8
To us, it seems impossible that this small number of mediations is having a significant
impact upon the number of trials in the overall system. To test this conclusion and provide data to
resolve this issue, we propose a simple study. As depicted in Figure 6, Study 3 would
measure/record the number of civil cases filed, civil trials, and mediations over a set number of
years. A simple comparison between the number of mediations and the number of civil cases (via
some lagged correlations) would allow researchers to determine if mediation were reducing the
number of trials.

http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Reports/The%20Effectiveness%20of
%20Case%20Evaluation%20and%20Mediation%20in%20MI%20Circuit%20Courts.pdf; Richard G. Spier,
Remarks at the Oregon Law Institute CLE on Mediation Tools and Techniques for Lawyers: Is mediation overused?
(Oct. 19, 2012) (article available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/SpierR3.cfm).
6

Federal Judicial Case Load Statistics 2014 Tables – US District Courts - Civil, (March 31, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014-tables
7

Civil Case Load, Court Statistic Project, http://www.courtstatistics.org/civil.aspx.

8

James A. Wall Jr. & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, Civil Case Mediations: Some Observations and Conclusions, THE
JURY EXPERT 5, 5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/WallChanSerifinTJESep2009Volume21No5.pdf.
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Study 3
Year

Civil Cases Filed

Civil Case Trials

Mediations

2010

x

x

x

2011

x

x

x

2012

x

x

x

2013

x

x

x

2014

x

x

x

2015

x

x

x

2016

x

x

x

2017

x

x

x

2018

x

x

x

2019

x

x

x

2020

x

x

x

Figure 6
Study 3

A second question concerning the effect of mediation on the overall legal system is,
“Does mediation reduce the time between filing of cases and their resolution?” Here again, we
believe there is not a significant effect because there are very few mediations relative to the
number of filed civil cases. However, a test of this query is simple to propose but rather difficult
to conduct (Figure 7).
In such an investigation – Study 4 – researchers would record the mediations over a
number of years as well as the time between the filing of a case and its resolution in trial. A
comparison between these figures (probably with a lagged correlation) would answer our
question.
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x

x
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x

x
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x

x

2016

x

x

2017

x

x

2018

x

x

2019

x

x

2020

x

x

Figure 7
Study 4

A final and most interesting question as to the effect of mediation on the overall legal
system is, “Does mediation improve the clients’ evaluation of the legal system?”
Many of the mediators we interviewed and observed stated that one of their goals was to
improve this evaluation, and they felt their mediation behavior accomplished this goal. Are these
mediators correct? Is the evaluation of the legal system more positive for plaintiffs and
defendants who go through mediation versus those who do not?
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The literature and our studies do imply this is the case. Together, they indicate that
disputants are generally satisfied with mediation, and it therefore seems logical to assume that
their satisfaction with the mediation would be extrapolated to a positive evaluation of the overall
legal system.
This effect, however, may not be a strong one, because mediators in their joint sessions
and caucuses tend to deride the legal system. Specifically, they hold that trials are time
consuming, costly, risky, controlled by strangers, and occasionally very unfair. Such denigration
perhaps reduces the clients’ positive extrapolations.
This deductive background sets the stage for a simple study to test for the positive effect.
In it, researchers can ask plaintiffs and defendants who utilized mediation how satisfied they
were with the procedure. Their responses can, in turn, be compared to those of disputants who
went to trial (without previously utilizing mediation).
A related and important question is whether or not mediation raises the general public’s
evaluation of the overall legal system. We think not, and advise that the question not be tested.
Our reasoning is that the number of parties utilizing mediation – percentage wise – is quite small
and therefore the chances of their positive evaluation propagating the legal system or the public’s
attitudes is miniscule.
Conclusion and Discussion
When we examine and reflect upon the two channels of the legal system, we can conclude
mediation is flowing quite well. Cases which enter mediation are handled expeditiously;
therefore, there is less delay and expense than in trials. In the mediations, mediators
utilize a wide variety of techniques and those mediators who are more assertive tend to produce
a higher level of agreements. Overall, mediators attain settlements about 70% of the
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time, and disputants tend to be very satisfied with the process.
In this mediation channel, there are a couple of questions that need to be tested. Namely,
is there a higher percentage of settlements in mediations than in the overall legal system, and is
there a higher level of client satisfaction in mediation than in trials? We have proposed studies to
answer these two questions.
When we consider the effect of mediation on the overall court system, we have more
questions than answers. Mediation does reduce the number of cases that go to trial, and it
probably does expedite cases that go to trial after mediation. However, mediation it seems does
not significantly reduce the number of cases going to trial. This short hypothesis needs to be
tested, and we propose a study to do so.
Another question that merits research is whether or not mediation reduces the time
between the filing of cases in the overall legal system and their resolution.
Finally, we ask if mediation improves the clients’ evaluation of the legal system. We
believe that it does; yet, this hypothesis should be tested. As to whether or not mediation
improves the general public’s view of the legal system, we hold that it does not. And the
conclusion seems so self-evident that it merits no test.
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